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A  B  ST  R  A  C  T 
S om e  road- pr i ci ng  demonst rati ons  use  an  appr oach  call ed  "val ue  pr ici ng",   in  whi ch  tr avelers  can
choose bet  ween a fr  ee but   congested roadway and a pri  ced roadway.   Recent   resear  ch has
uncover ed  a  pot enti all y  ser ious  pr obl em   for   such  demonst rati ons:  in  cert ain  models,  second- best
t ol ls  ar e  far   lower   than  those  typicall y  charged,   and  t he  wel fare  gains  from  pr ofi t  maxim izati on  ar e
small   or   even  negat i ve.  That  research,  however ,  assum es  that   al l  tr aveler s  ar e  ident i cal,   and  it 
t herefor e  neglect s  the  benefi ts  of   pr oduct  dif fer enti at i on,  by  which  people  wit h  dif f er ent  val ues  of
t im e  can  choose  a  suit abl e  cost / qual i ty  com binat i on.  Usi ng  a  model  wit h  two  user   groups,  we  fi nd
t hat  account i ng  for   heter ogenei t y  in  value  of  ti m e  is  im port ant   in  evaluati ng  constr ained  poli ci es, 
and  impr oves  the  rel at ive  per for mance  of  pol icies  that  off er   di ff er ent ial   pri ces.  Never thel ess,  for 
m ost  of   the  reasonable  r ange  of   heter ogenei t y,   second-best   pr icing  produces  f ar   fewer   benef i ts  t han
pri ci ng  both  roadways  opt im al ly,   and  pr of it - maxi m izing  tol ls  ar e  so  hi gh  that   over al l   wel far e  is
r educed  fr om   the  no- toll   baseli ne. 
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T HE   V AL U E  OF  "V AL UE   PR IC I NG"  OF  ROAD S:
SEC ON D-B EST  PRI CI NG  AN D  PRODU CT   DI FFE RE NT IA TI ON 
1. INTRODUCTION
Road-pr ici ng  concept s  have  moved  to  center   stage  in  many  tr ansportation  planni ng  and  pol icy-
maki  ng venues around the wor  ld.   Sm  al  l and Gómez-I  banez (1998) descri  be thirt  een signif  icant
appl ications  under   consideration  in  nine  countr ies,  seven  of   them   im pl emented  as  of  mi d-1997.
More pr  oject  s have been undertaken subsequently, including an innovative no-  cash system   using
combined electr  oni  c and vi  deo coll  ection technology on a new expressway near   Toronto, Ontari  o,
which opened in October   1997. Meanwhile, har  dly an issue of the mont  hly Toll   Roads  Newslet ter
goes  by  wi thout   account s  of  new  pr icing  pr oposals  by  gover nm ent   agencies.
Yet in onl  y one case (S  ingapore) has congest  ion pr  icing been adopt  ed in somethi  ng li  ke a fir  st-  best
form :  signif icant  ti me- of- day  vari at ions  applyi ng  to  an  enti re  road  net wor k.   Al l  other  appli cat ions
ar e  lim ited,   such  as  toll  ri ngs  wi th  fi xed  or  near ly  fi xed  toll s  (Norway),  behavior al   exper im ent s
(S tuttgart ),   or   pr icing  on  a  si ngl e  facili ty  (F rance,  Ontari o,  Cal if ornia,   Texas,  Fl ori da) .  Increasi ngl y,
the favored approach is to adopt small-  scale "demonstration projects" intended to test and publ  ici  ze
pr icing  concept s  and  their   associated  technologies.  Thi s  approach  is  speci fi cal ly  funded  in  U.S .
legi  slation passed i  n 1991 and reauthorized in 1998.
Three  of  the  demonst rat ions  cur rentl y  oper at ing—in  Orange  Count y  (Calif ornia),  San  Diego,  and
Houston—let travel  er  s choose between two adj  acent roadways: one fr  ee but congested, the ot  her
pr  iced but   free-fl  owing. Thi  s scheme is sometim  es called "value pr  icing" because people ar  e given
the opt  ion t  o pay for a more hi  ghl  y val  ued service, much as train or   ai  r t  ravelers can pur  chase a fi  rst  -
cl ass  ticket .  In  these  par ti cul ar  examples,  the  expr ess  lanes  also  serve  car pools  at   zero  or   at   reduced
rates,  and  so  are  known  as  "High  Occupancy/T oll "  (HOT)  lanes.  (In  Houst on,   furt her more,   the
value-pricing opti  on is avai  lable only to peopl  e i  n two-person car  pools.)
Recent research, however, has uncovered a potential problem wit  h val  ue pri  ci  ng as a dem  onstr  ati  on
of   r oad  pr icing.  T hi s  r esear ch  exami nes  the  nat ure  of  "second-best "  pri cing  of  two  parallel  roadways
when  one  is  free  (Br aid  (1996),   Verhoef   et   al.,   [1996],   Li u  and  McDonal d  [1999] ).  An  appl icati on
of   these met  hods by Liu and McDonald (1998),   designed to approximate condi  ti  ons for the Or  ange
County  val ue-pr ici ng  demonst rat ion,  suggests  that  in  a  second-best   opti mum ,  the  expr ess  toll   would
be far lower   than the toll  s act  ual  ly being char  ged, and the express lanes would oper  ate wi  th
considerably more congesti  on than they act  ually do. Fur  therm  ore, Liu and McDonald fi  nd that
pr icing  the  express  lanes  lower s  wel far e  com par ed  to  leavi ng  them  fr ee.   In  other  wor ds,   the
demonst  rat  ion cannot   be shown, based on thei  r model,   to make peopl  e bet  ter   off com  pared to using
the  lanes  for  general  traf fi c.  Thi s  is  obviousl y  a  potenti al ly  ser ious  weakness  in  a  st rat egy  of  usi ng
such  demonst rat ions  to  gai n  public  support   f or  broader  pri ci ng  schem es.   K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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However , the Li u and McDonal d anal ysis,  li ke the other paper s ment ioned above, makes the
si mplif ying  assumpti on  that  all   tr avelers  ar e  identi cal .  Thi s  assumption  obscur es  the  benefi ts  of
of fering  a  diff erent iat ed  pr oduct  in  or der   to  allow  people  to  indulge  thei r  var ying  prefer ences.  To
anal  yze the sit  uat  ion f  ull  y,   we need a model   that includes vari  ati  on in value of t  im  e.
This  paper   expl ores  the  im portance  of  heterogeneit y  in  val ue  of   ti me  for  val ue- pri ci ng
demonst  rat  ions.   We extend the Liu and McDonald model   to two user groups di  ff  eri  ng by value of
ti me  (after  fir st  si mpl ifying  the  model   by  consideri ng  just  one  ti me  period) .  We  find  that 
heterogeneit y  can  make  a  signif icant   di fference  in  eval uat ing  revenue-m axi mi zing  and  second- best
poli cies.  St ill ,  onl y  with  quit e  ext rem e  assumptions  can  we  find  positi ve  welfare  benef its  f or  pri vate
(i .e.  revenue-m axi mi zing)  owner shi p  of  express  lanes  compared  to  making  them   fr ee.  We  al so
exam  ine a policy, adopt  ed in the San Di  ego demonst  ration, of   setti  ng the tol  l just   high enough to
maintai  n a specifi  ed level   of service on the express lanes; we find thi  s pol  icy to perf  orm   only
sl ightl y  bet ter   than  the  r evenue-m aximi zing  pol icy  on  welf ar e  grounds.
A few other papers have addr  essed heter  ogeneity in value of tim  e in a two-  route pr  oblem  . Ar  nott et
al .  (1992)   use  a  dynami c  bott leneck  model  to  investigat e  first- best  pri cing  in  such  a  cont ext ,  also
wi  th two t  ypes of tr  aveler  s.   They show that separati  ng the t  wo user groups on t  wo roadways m  ay be
opti mal   if   one  group  has  bot h  higher   tr avel- tim e  and  schedul e-delay  costs  than  the  other.  Br adf ord
(1996) shows that in a queue system wit  h mul  tiple servers,   a revenue-maxim  izing syst  em
admi nistrator  woul d  charge  higher  tolls,  hence  off er ing  lower  congestion,  than  is  socially  opti mal .
More di  rectl  y related to our   case is Schm  anske (1991, 1993),   who shows that wit  h het  erogeneous
user s,  dif ferential  tol ls  on  separ at e  roadways  may  be  superi or  to  a  single  toll .  Verhoef   and  Small
(1999)  consi der   heterogeneit y  using  a  cont inuous  val ue- of- ti me  distr ibution,   calibrated  fr om   Dutch
st at ed- preference  data,   and  also  account  f or   the  possibili ty  that  users  of   t he  two  r oadways  int eract   on
a  congested  ser ial   link  el sewhere  as  part  of   their   trips;  their   conclusions  are  br oadly  consist ent   with
those of t  hi  s paper. 
Our analysis does not purpor  t to be a complete assessment of   the SR91 or any ot  her   actual
demonst rat ion  proj ects,   which  are  of ten  constrained  by  a  var iet y  of  financial  and  legal 
considerat  ions.   In part  icular, we do not treat incentives for high-occupancy vehi  cles (HOVs) or
capacit y  costs.   Sm al l  (1983)   and  Dahl gren  (1998)   consider  HOV  lanes,  and  Vi ton  (1995)   exami nes
the questi  on of   when fi  nanci  ng highway capacity through pr  ivate toll   collect  ion is viable. 
2. THE MODEL
We  consi der  two  roadways,   A  and  B,   connecti ng  the  sam e  ori gi n  and  dest inati on.  Bot h  have  the
sam e  lengt h  L    and  the  sam e  free- f low  travel- t im e  T  f L  .   A  user   of  type  i   (i  =1, 2)   tr avel i ng  on  road  r
(  r=A, B)   incurs  tr avel   cost   cir which consi  sts of operat  ing cost β  p l   u s  a  t i   m e  c o s t    α  iT  r  per uni  t
distance. The par  am  eter α  i  is  the  value  of  ti m e,   and  it   is  thi s  par am eter  for   whi ch  we  intr oduce
het er ogeneit y,  by  assumi ng  that   α  1 >α  2 .   Uni t  travel   tim e  T  r   (t he  inverse  of  speed)  is  repr esent ed  by
f low  congest i on  of  a  standard  t ype,  dependi ng  on  volume- capacit y  rat io  Nr /  Kr   so  t hat :  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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() [] K / N + 1     L T   +   L   =   ) N ( c            r r
k
f i r ir γ α β    B A r i , ; 2 , 1 = = ( 1) 
where γ   and k  ar e  par am et ers.  The  congesti on- dependent   part   of   cost,   dir ≡  α  iT  f L  γ  (  Nr /  Kr ) 
k ,   is  what
we call   del ay  cost . 
1 We use values γ  =0. 15  and  k=4,   f ol l owing  com mon  practi ce.
2
Dem  and by each gr  oup has the li  near for  m
P b   -   a   =   ) P ( N            i i i i i ( 2) 
where ai and bi  ar e  posit ive  par am eters  and  P  i  is  the  "i ncl usive  pri ce",  defi ned  as  the  mi ni mum 
com bi nat ion  of  tr avel  cost  pl us  toll   (τ  )   f or   t his  user   group: 
{} τ r ir
r
i + c Min   =   P            ( 3) 
T he  i nverse  dem and  funct i on  f or   user   type  i   is denoted P  i(  Ni) ,  and  easil y  sol ved  f rom   ( 2) .
T he  soci al   welf ar e  funct i on  i s  def ined  as  t he  ar ea  under   t he  inverse  dem and  cur ve  mi nus  t ot al
cost: 











∑ ∑ ∫ ∑ ( 4) 
where Nir is the number of   type-i   user  s on road r.   Thi s  funct i on  is  str ict ly  concave  in  the  four
var iabl es  Nir. 
2  .1 T  yp  es   o  f   Sol  u  ti  on 
T he  equi li br i um   condit ions  ar e  those  of   War dr op  (1952),   stat ing  that  users  of   a  given  type
choose  the  r oad  or  roads  that   m i ni mi ze  incl usi ve  pr ice,   and  that  those  i ncl usive  pri ces  be  equal i zed, 
f or   those  users,  if   they  use  bot h  roads.  We  assum e  that   if   the  roads  are  di ff er ent iat ed  it  is  road  A
t hat  of f er s  faster  travel ,  so  that   N1 A>0 and N2 B>0.   T hi s  i s  a  subst ant ive  r estr i ct ion  if  the  r oads  ar e  of
unequal   capacit y.   War dr op's  condi ti ons  can  then  be  wri t ten: 
      () () B B B A A A N c N c τ τ + ≤ + 1 1 (5.a)
      () () B B B A A A N c N c τ τ + ≥ + 2 2 (5.b)
      () 0 1 1 1 = − − + ⋅ B B A A B c c N τ τ (5.c)
      () 0 2 2 2 = − − + ⋅ A A B B A c c N τ τ (5.d)
      0 , 2 1 ≥ A B N N  (5.e)
                                                            
1 This particular functional form has the property that the marginal external cost, ( the additional delay cost by a driver on all








 ⋅ = ∂ ∂ ≡ ∑ ∑ .
2 See Small (1992), pp,69-72, for a discussion of empirical evidence for this functional form. These particular parameters are
known as the Bureau of Public Roads formula.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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I t  is  usef ul   to  dist ingui sh  four   possible  cases,   dependi ng  on  whether  each  of   (5a)   and  (5b)   is  an
i nequal i ty  or   an  equal it y. 
Case  SE :   ful l y  separat ed  equi li bri um.   Both  (5a)   and  (5b)   ar e  inequal i ti es,   i.e.,   each  group
str ictl y  pref er s  a  dif fer ent  roadway.   Because  we  assumed  α  1 >α  2 ,   t hese  condi ti ons  requi r e
3  that   r oad
A be mor  e expensi  ve but less congest  ed than road B,   i  .e.  , τ  A >τ  B and (NA /  KA ) <( NB/  KB) .
Case  SE 1:  parti al ly  separat ed  equi li bri um  wi th  group  1  separated.   Group  1  st r ictl y  prefer s
r oad  A,   but  group  2  is  indi ff er ent :  that  is,   (5a)   is  an  inequal it y  but   (5b)   an  equal it y.   Li ke  the  ful ly
separ at ed  equil ibri um,   SE 1  requi res  that  road  A  have  hi gher  tol l  but   lower  tr avel  ti m es.  Not e  it   is
not   impossibl e  that   N2 A=0,   if  thi s  condi ti on  happens  to  yiel d  indi f ference  for   gr oup  2;  we  woul d
expect thi  s onl  y by coincidence. 
Case  SE 2:  part i al ly  separat ed  equi li bri um  wi th  group  2  separat ed.   Gr oup  2  str i ct ly  pr ef er s
r oad  B,   but  group  1  is  i ndi ff er ent :  (5a)  is  an  equal it y,   (5b)   an  i nequality.   Agai n,   r oad  A  m ust   have  a
higher  tol l  but   is  faster .  The  boundary  sol uti on  N1 B=0  can  occur ;   thi s  possi bil it y  is  in  fact   relevant
because  of   t he  second- best  opti m izat i on  process,   which  may  someti mes  set   the  const rai ned- opt im al 
t ol l  just  low  enough  to  ret ai n  all   type-1  user s  as  toll - road  cust om ers.  Despi te  the  wor d  "separat ed"
i n  the  nam es  of   these  cases,  it   is  the  equal it y  or  inequal it y  of  costs  in  (5a-b) ,  not   the  pr esence  or 
absence  of   a  gi ven  type  of  user   on  both  r oads,   t hat   f or m al ly  di st ingui shes  case  SE 2  from  SE . 
Case  IE :   ful l y  integrated  equil i brium.   Bot  h groups are indi  ff  erent   between the two roads;
( 5a-b)  hol d  wit h  bot h  inequal it ies  replaced  by  equal i ti es.   Since  the  two  groups  have  dif f er ent 
val  ues of ti  m  e,   thi  s can occur onl  y if the roads have equal tol  ls and equal   speeds. We assum  e thi  s
equil ibr ium  always  appli es  if   no  t ol l s  ar e  charged,   and  it   t urns  out   t hat   i s  the  onl y  t im e  it  appli es.
2  .2 Pri  ci  ng   Re  gi  mes 
We  consi der  five  al t er nat ive  pr i ci ng  regi mes,  al so  call ed  pol icies. 
F irst -best   regi me  (F B) :   a  publ ic  oper at or   char ges  tol l s  on  both  roads  that  maxim ize  wel far e  (4) .  It 
can  be  shown  that   t his  poli cy  yi el ds  convent ional   m ar gi nal -cost   pri cing  on  each  road. 
Second- best  regi me  (S B) :   t he  same  object ive  i s  pur sued  but  subject   to  t he  const raint   B τ =0. 
 Third-  best  regi me  (T B) :   like  SB  but   wit h  an  addit ional   constr ai nt   desi gned  to  guar ant ee  a
m inim um   level   of  ser vi ce  on  t he  pr iced  roadway,  nam el y
4
                                                            
3 Sub  tracting the secon  d from   the first o  f equations (5) an  d applying (1) yields () ( )
k
A A 2 1 K / N α α − <() ( )
k
A A 2 1 K / N α α − , which
(given 
2 1 α α > and  0 k > ) implies 
B B A A K / N K / N < . This in turn implies  , c c B 2 A 2 <  so the second of equations (5) is
possible only if 
B A τ τ >
4  Th e  particular  value  0.887   is  chosen   becau se  it  is  the  max im um  volum e-capacity  ratio   fo r  lev el  of  service  D  (Transpo rtatio n
Research  B oard,  19 94 ,  T able  3-1 ),  wh ich   is  the  min im um  lev el  of  serv ice  bein g  soug ht  in   th e  199 9  reauth orizatio  n o  f the San Diego
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A ≤ ( 6) 
P rofi t- maximi zi ng  regi me  (P M) :   A τ   is  chosen  to  maxim i ze  revenues  subj ect   to  the  constr ai nt
B τ =0. 
No- toll   regi me  (NT) :   A τ  , B τ =0. 
T he  no- t ol l  regim e  consi sts  of  sol vi ng  (1)- ( 3)   and  (5)  wit h  equal it i es  in  ( 5a)  and  (5b) ;  the  sol uti on
i s  assum ed  to  be  of   the  int egrat ed  equi li br i um   (I E)   type,  si nce  ther e  is  nothing  to  disti nguish  the
t wo  roadways  fr om   each  ot her.   Each  of   the  ot her  regim es  call s  for   maxi mi zing  ei t her  wel fare,   as
given  by  (4) ,   or  revenues  R  =∑ r r rN τ ,   whi le  im posing  const rai nt s  (5)   and,   in  the  case  of  thi rd-
best,   constr aint  (6) .
Our   sol uti on  st rategy
5  is  f ir st  to  choose  an  equi li br i um   case  (SE 1,  SE 2,  or   S E )  to  test .  We  for m  the
r el evant   L agrangi an,  sim pl if ying  by  taki ng  advantage  of   the  requi rement,   by  (5c-d) ,  that   one  or
bot h  of   N1 B and N2 A  be  zer o,  dependi ng  on  the  regi m e.   (S peci fi cal ly,   N1 B=0  in  regi me  SE 1,   N2 A=0
i n  SE 2,   and  bot h  ar e  zer o  in  SE . )  We  then  solve  the  fir st- or der   condit ions  numer ical l y  for  Nir and
r τ .   Next,   we  check  the  non- negati vit y  const rai nt s  (5e);   i f   eit her   of  them  is  not  sat isf ied,   we  i mpose
i t  as  an  equali ty  and  again  sol ve  the  fir st - or der   condi t ions.   In  the  case  of  TB,   we  also  check  the
l evel -of -ser vice  const rai nt   and,   if  it  is  vi ol at ed,   we  impose  it  as  an  equali ty  and  start   over .  We  then
check  the  appropr iat e  inequal it y  (5a  or   5b  or  bot h)   def i ni ng  the  equil ibr ium  type  under 
consi der at ion;  if   it   is  violated,  we  conclude  that  this  equi l ibri um   type  cannot   exist   for   this  set  of 
par am et ers.  In  this  manner  we  generat e  up  to  thr ee  candi date  soluti ons,  (one  for   each  equil i br ium 
t ype) ,  and  we  choose  t he  one  for   whi ch  the  maxim i zed  obj ecti ve  funct ion  is  largest .
An  exam ple  i s  i nstr uct ive.  Consi der  the  SE1  equi l ibri um   for  the  t hi r d- best  (T B)   poli cy  regi m e.   F or
t hi s  scenari o  B τ =0,   (5a)   hol ds  as  an  inequali ty  and  consequent ly  N1 B=0,   and (5b)   holds as an
equal it y.  Therefore  equat ions  ( 3)  and  ( 5a-d)   sim pli fy  t o:
A 1 1 A c P − = τ ( 7a)
A 2 2 A 1 1 c P c P − = − ( 7b)
0 c P B 2 2 = − ( 7c)
0 c P B 1 1 < − ( 7d)
where it   is to be remembered that P  i is a functi  on of   (NiA+NiB)   thr ough  (2)   and  cir is a functi  on of 
( N1 r+N2 r)   thr ough  (1) .  We  solve  the  problem  by  using  ordi nary  L agrangi an  methods  to  fi nd  the
val ues  of  N1 A,   N2 A,   and  N2 B  that   m axi mi ze  (4)  subject  to  equali t y  const raint s  (7b)   and  (7c);   t hen  A τ
                                                            
5 In th  e A  ppend  ix, we enum  erate th  e full set of po  ssible solu  tions. F  or mo  st cases th  ey   are n  ot of closed form, so   requ ire  nu merical
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i s  calculated  from  (7a).   The  non-negati vi ty  const raint  0 N A 2 ≥  is then checked,   and (4)   is
m axim ized  again,  and  imposed  as  an  equal it y  if  needed.   S i mi larl y  the  level- of- ser vi ce  constr aint  is
checked  and  imposed  if   needed.  Final l y,   the  inequal it y  (7d)  is  checked  to  see  if   the  tr ial  sol ut i on  is
val id.
3. SIMULATION RESULTS
In  this  sect ion,  we  design  several   scenari os  to  expl ore  the  eff ect s  of  het er ogenei ty  in  value  of  travel 
ti  me on the eff  ici  ency of various pr  ici  ng policies. We begin wi  th a base scenar  io that resem  bles
SR91,  the  demonstr at ion  si te  in  Or ange  Count y,  Cal if ornia.   We  then  consider  alt ernat e  demand
paramet ers,  fir st  changing  the  rel at ive  si zes  of  groups  1  and  2,  then  changi ng  pri ce  el asticiti es.  Next 
we  consider  a  scenar io  wit h  much  heavier  traffi c.  Fi nal ly  we  al ter   the  rel at ive  capacit y  of  the  two
roadways, making road A the larger   one. Table 1 pr  esents the par  am  eters used in these scenari  os. 
Except for   the uni  t val  ue of   tr  avel tim  e, the cost   paramet  er  s are the same as in Liu and McDonald
(1998). 
Table 1. Parameter Values Used in Simulations












β   ( cent s/m i.)  6. 8 6. 8 6. 8 6. 8 6. 8
KA (veh./hr. ) 2000 2000 2000 2000 4000
KB (veh./hr. ) 4000 4000 4000 4000 2000
1 a 5700 3800 7150 6780 5700
2 a 5700 7600 7150 6780 5700
No tes:
1.  The  follo win g  p ar ameter s  are  th e  sam e  in  all  scen arios:  L=10   miles;  15 . 0 = γ ;  4 = k ;  9231 . 0 = f T
2.  A ver age  v alu e  o f  tim e  is  def ined  as :  () () NT NT NT NT N N N N 2 1 2 2 1 1 / + + α α   and   it  is   3 4.8   cents/m in.  in  all  scenario s.
NT
i N is   the  num ber  o f  typ e  i us er s  in  n o- toll  r eg ime.
3.  A t  each   p oin t  o f  value- of -time  differen ce,  the  slopes  o f  dem and   f unctio ns   is   ch os en  to  maintain   the  elas ticities   o f  two 
gr ou ps  at  –0 .60   in   h igh -elas ticity   s cen ario  and   at  – 0.3 3  in  oth er  scenario s  and   th e  tim e  d if fer ence  between roads un  der 
PM  r egime  is   15   minu tes   in   h igh -co ng estion   s cen ario  and   8  minutes  in   other   s cen arios   ex cep t  rev ers ed -capacity  s cen ar io.
To preserve com  par  abili  ty wi  th Liu and McDonald, we mostly use the same paramet  ers: L=10 mil  es
(16. 1  km),   β =6.8  cents  per  vehicle- mil e  (4. 72  cents/veh- km) ,  Tf=65  mil es  per  hour   (105  km /hr), 
and  capaci ti es  KA=2000 and KB=4000  vehi cl es  per   hour .
3  .  1   Ba  s  e   Sc  e  n  a  r  i  o 
In  this  scenari o,  we  choose  the  demand  par am eters  so  that  in  the  no- tol l  (NT )  regi me  the  pri ce
el asticity  of  demand  is  -0. 33  as  in  Liu  and  McDonal d,   and  so  that  our   pr ofi t- maximi zi ng  (PM)
poli  cy produces a toll of about   $2.75 and a travel   time di  ff  erenti  al   between routes of about   8  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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mi nutes,  thereby  replicati ng  actual  condit ions  on  SR-91  in  June  1997  (S ull ivan,   1997).  Thi s  is
achi eved  wit h  an  average  val ue  of  ti me  of  34.38  cent s/m in.   ( $20.63/hr.  ),   which  i s  m uch  higher  than
the val  ue of   $6.36 per hour in Liu and McDonald's paper  .
Table 2. Results for Base Scenario Under Homogeneity
PRICING  RE GI ME
a FB SB TB PM NT 
Type of   equi  librium
b SE 2 SE 2 SE 2 SE 2 IE 
Toll 
c –  A 389. 21 72.61 267. 29 275. 53 0
Toll 
 – B 389.  19 0 0 0 0
Speed
d – A 49.6 44.8 59.4 60 40
Speed – B 49.6 38.7 33.5 33.3 40
Delay Cost 
c
 1  A 97.30 144. 21 29.48 26.24 198. 30
  1B 97.34 216. 82 296. 77 301. 78 198. 30
 2A --  --  --  --  198.  19
  2B 97.28 216. 69 296. 60 301. 60 198. 19
Rel.   Use
e - 1 0. 84 0. 99 0. 94 0. 94 1. 00
Rel.   Use  –  2 0. 84 0. 99 0. 94 0. 94 1. 00
El ast.
f – 1 -0.59 -0.34 -0.41 -0.41 -0.33
El ast.  –  2 -0.59 -0.34 -0.41 -0.41 -0.33
Welf  are Gain per vehi  cle
g 61 4 -40 -45 0
No tes:
a  P ricin g  r eg imes:  FB=f irs t  b es t;  SB=s eocnd  best;  TB=thir d  b es t;  PM=p rof it  maxim ization;  NT=n o  toll  ( see  Section   2.2) 
b  Typ es  of  eq uilibr iu m:  SE2 =p artially   separ ated  eq .,  gr oup   2   separ ated;  IE=integrated  eq .  (see  S ectio n  2 .1 )
c  A ll  co sts   ( toll,  delay   co st,  w elf ar e  g ain )  are  in   cents  p er   vehicle.  D elay  cos t  is  def ined  as  () k
r r f i K N L T / γ α .
d  S peed  is  in   miles   p er  hou r.
e  Relative  us e  o f  g ro up  is  relative  to  the  no -to ll  regim e,  i.e.  NT
i i N N / .
f  Elas t.  is   d emand  elasticity   at  us ag e  level  in  the  s olu tio n.
g  W elfar e  g ain  is  d iv ided  b y  usage  in   th e  N T  reg ime,  i.e. () NT NT N W W / − .
The sim  ulati  on resul  ts for   homogenous user  s are shown in Table 2. The patt  er  n of result  s is the
same  as  in  L iu  and  McDonal d  (1998) .  The  welf are  gain  fr om  second-best  pricing  ( SB)   is  smal l,   and
that   fr om  one-r out e  profit -m axi mizing  poli cy  (P M)  is  negat ive.  The  relative  eff ici ency  of  the
second- best  com par ed  to  the  fir st- best  pol icy
6 is about 6%   and that of profit  -maxi  mizing poli  cy
(P  M)   is about -74%;   these compare t  o 9% and -50% respecti  vel  y i  n Liu and McDonald. I  n additi  on, 
the  second-best   toll   is  much  lower   than  the  fir st- best  tol l,  thus  it  has  litt le  ef fect  on  tot al   tr aff ic.  The
fi rst-best   toll   is  about  50  per cent  higher   than  the  profit -m axi mizing  toll   and  reduces  tot al   tr aff ic  by
about t  hree tim  es as much.   With no t  oll   (NT)  , speed would be 40 mi  les per hour. 
                                                            




NT), w  here W  is  defined  in  equ ation   (3 )  and   th e  sup erscripts  ind icate
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Now we tur  n to the effects of product diff  er  ent  iat  ion by examining how the simulat  ion result  s
change when the two groups are assigned di  ff  erent values of travel   t  ime. We let    1 α  and  2 α  diverge
by a gi  ven amount  α ∆ . At   the sam  e time we alter the sl  opes of demand functi  ons to keep the
el  asticity of two type users and the weighted average val  ue of tr  avel tim  e (wei  ghted by the num  ber
of   user s  of  each  type  in  the  no-toll   regim e)   in  no-t oll   regi me  unchanged.  Resul ts  ar e  shown  in
Fi gure  1a- c.   At   the  far   left   of   each  of   panels,   user s  are  homogeneous.  At  the  far  ri ght ,  the  two
gr oups'  value  of  tim e  are  2. 37  cents/mi n.  and  66.39  cents/ mi n.  The  part ial ly  separ at ed  equil ibr ium 
SE 2  rem ains  opt imal  for   al l  pri cing  pol ici es;  that   is,  group  1  users  use  bot h  roads,   which  is  not
surprising because group 1 cont  ains hal  f the popul  at  ion of   potenti  al   users but the expr  ess road
cont  ains onl  y a thir  d of t  he total   capacit  y. 






























Fi  gure 1a shows the tol  ls as the functi  on of   heter  ogeneity. In the three constr  ained pr  ici  ng policies,
the tol  l rises sharply wit  h the di  ff  erence in value of tim  e.   At   the middle of the di  agr  am,   the second-
best   (S B)  toll  has  near ly  tr ipl ed  compared  to  what   it  was  wi th  ident ical  val ues  of   t ime,  alt hough  it   is
st il l  barely  half  the  prof it -maxim izing  (P M)   toll.   T he  thi rd-best  (T B)  tol l  is  nearl y  i denti cal   to  t hat   of 
PM.
The  fir st- best  (FB)  tol l  is  indeed  diff erent iat ed,   but  there  is  a  surpr ise  here:  the  toll  di fferenti al  get s
larger at fi  rst   but then get  s smal  ler agai  n when het  erogenei  ty is extreme.   The reason is that when
heterogeneit y  is  lar ge,   the  mar ginal   benef it   of   accommodat ing  one  more  type  1  user   is  larger   than
that   of   accommodat ing  one  more  type  2  user .  The  fi rst-best   poli cy  therefor e  accomm odates  many
more type 1 users than type 2 user  s on route B:   the num  ber   of type 1 users incr  eases by about 30%
wi  th the increase of   heter  ogeneity, whi  le the number   of   type 2 decreases by mor  e than 30%.   As a
result,   the  dif fer ence  bet ween  average  val ues  of  t ravel   ti me  on  the  two  rout es  becom es  small .
Fi  gure 1b shows the travel   time on both rout  es under   the second-best   and profit  -maxi  mizing
poli cies,  as  well  as  under   the  no- toll  regim e.  Profi t  maxi mi zat ion  (PM)   cr eates  a  much  great er
qual ity  di ff erenti al   between  the  two  roads  than  does  second- best,   an  indi cat ion  of  exer ci se  of
monopol  y power on the priced roadway. The third-best   regim  e (not shown)   is almost ident  ical to
PM.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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Fi gure  1c  shows  the  wel far e  changes,   al l  rel ati ve  to  no  toll   (NT).   The  wel fare  gai ns  fr om  al l  the
di ff erenti al -pr ici ng  policies  are  much  great er  when  there  is  more  heter ogeneity.  The  ef ficienci es  of 
the  thr ee  const rai ned  r egi mes  also  i mpr ove  when  measured  as  fracti ons  of  possible  fi rst -best   welfare
gains: for   exam  ple, the SB welf  are gain incr  eases fr  om 6% to 28% of FB.   Even so, the pr  ofi  t- 
maxi  mizing poli  cy al  ways produces a wel  far  e loss (compared to no tol  l) and thir  d-best pricing
al  most always does; and both perform   consi  st  ent  ly worse than second-  best when evaluated
accordi  ng to welfare gain. 








































































To check the sensi  ti  vit  y of our   results to aver  age value of tim  es,   we recalculate the base scenari  o
using half   the previ  ous value, i.e. $10.32 per hour,   while adjusti  ng inter  cepts and slopes to maintain  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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pr ice  elasti cit y  of  -0. 33  and  a  t ime  di ff erenti al   under   PM  of  8  m inutes.  The  qual itative  result s  do  not 
change. 
3  .2   Pro  p  orti  o  na  l-  De  man  d Sce  na  ri  o 
In  order  to  examine  cases  where  pr oduct   di ff erenti at ion  mi ght  be  mor e  import ant ,  we  next  consider
a scenario wher  e the numbers of   user  s in the two groups ar  e approxim  ately pr  oporti  onal to the
capacit y  of  cor respondi ng  roadway.   We  accomplish  thi s  by  set ting  the  inter cepts  of   the  dem and
functions  pr oporti onall y  t o  the  relative  capaci ties,   i. e.  1 α / 2 α  = A K / B K =1/2, whil  e keeping the total
demand under   no toll   fi  xed. The sl  opes of demand functi  ons are also changed to make bot  h types of
user   have the same elasticit  y as in the base scenari  o. Under   homogeneit  y, the value of tim  e is set   at
the sam  e amount   as i  n base scenari  o and the result  s are changed hardly from the base scenari  o.
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We  intr oduce  the  het erogenei ty  in  this  scenario  by  incr easing  1 α  twi  ce as fast as we decrease  2 α .
Thus the distri  but  ion of val  ues of   time becomes not onl  y disper  sed but also skewed. The sl  opes of
demand funct  ions are changed as in the base scenar  io. The resul  ts ar  e shown in Figur  e 2a-b. At the
far right of   each of   the panels, t  he value of t  ime of type 1 users i  s 2.37 cent  s/m  in., whi  le that of   type
2 users is 98.40 cents/  min.
Fi  gure 2a shows the change of t  oll  s wit  h value of ti  me dif  ference.   T  he pat  tern of change i  s sim  ilar to
base  scenari o.  Figur e  2b  shows  that  the  welf are  gain  fr om  fi rst -best   (F B)  pr ici ng  is  al most  the  same
as  i n  the  base  scenario.  But   this  ti me  the  T B  and  PM  policies  are  consi der ably  im pr oved,  gener ati ng
posi tive  wel far e  gai ns  under   moder at e  t o  lar ge  het er ogenei ty.  F urt hermore,   t he  second-best   poli cy  is
much  more  ef ficient  in  thi s  scenar io,  with  relative  eff ici ency  around  45%  wi th  moder ate  value-of-
ti  me di  fferences. The reason for these resul  ts is that the diff  erent  iat  ed pr  oduct is better mat  ched to
the  dif fer ent  user   t ypes  i n  thi s  scenar io;   f ewer  users  are  f orced  into  the  wrong  qualit y.
The change of travel   ti  me under   each policy in thi  s scenar  io is al  most the same as the one in base
scenari  o, so is not shown. 
3  .3   Hig  h  -Ela  s  ti  ci  ty   an  d Hig  h-  Co  n  ge  st  i  on   Sce  n  ario  s 
Here we fi  rst consider a scenar  io wi  th higher price elasti  ci  ty of demand, namel  y -0.  60 in the no-  tol  l
regi me.   The  wei ghed  average  val ue  of   ti me  is  kept  at   34.38  cent s/m in.  Result s  are  shown  in  Figures
3a and 3b. 
Fi gure  3a  shows  that   the  second-best   toll  is  much  hi gher,  and  the  fi rst -best   lower ,  in  thi s  scenar io.
This  is  well   known  from   pr evious  studies  (Verhoef   et   al.,   1996);  wel fare- maxim izi ng  policies  are
now  aim ed  more  at  moder ati ng  total   demand  than  at  di str ibuti ng  dem and  across  the  t wo  roads.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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Fi  gure 3b shows that   the eff  ici  ency of the PM and TB policies is improved si  gni  ficantly. Bot  h of
them   can generate posit  ive welf  are gain when value of time diff  erence is greater than 30 cents/  min.
SB is not im  proved, because it emphasizes the toll   diff  erent  ial  , whi  ch is less impor  tant now. Thus
the gap between SB and the other constr  ained policies i  s l  ess, though stil  l there. 
Next ,  we  consider  a  scenar io  wi th  hi gher  congestion,   namel y  a  t ravel -ti me  di fferenti al  of  15  mi nut es
under P  M. We again accompl  ish t  his by changi  ng the i  ntercept  s and sl  opes of the demand funct  ions.
The result  s,   shown in F  igures 3c and 3d, are mostl  y sim  ilar to the base scenari  o, but two di  fferences
st  and out.   The TB policy produces a much higher   toll   than PM because of   the heavier traffi  c;   and
PM  now  all ows  substanti al  congesti on  on  the  tol l  lanes.   The  wel far e  eff ect s  in  thi s  scenar io  ar e
si mi lar   to  t hose  i n  the  hi gh-el ast icity  scenari o.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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3  .4   Rev  e  rs  ed  -  Ca  pa  ci  t  y Sc  e  na  ri  o
In order to make a full  y separated equi  libri  um mor  e likely, we tri  ed inter  changing the two roadway
capacit  ies: 4000 veh/  hr for   t  he express lanes and 2000 for the free lanes. Al  l other par  ameters are as
in t  he base scenar  io.
Results ar  e shown in Fi  gur  e 4. The t  hree one-route pricing poli  cies have higher   toll  s in t  hi  s scenar  io
because the free roadway is less import  ant   as a substit  ute. SB has a hi  gher wel  far  e gai  n because it
can charge f  or mor  e capaci  ty. P  M and TB generat  e bigger   welf  are losses.   K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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We  get  dif ferent  equili bri um   cases  in  this  scenari o.   Most  inter est ing,  as  heter ogeneity  is  incr eased,
user   di  fferences sim  ply become too great to be wor  th accom  modat  ing on a shar  ed roadway,   and the
opti mal   equi libria  t end  to  become  fully  separat ed  (S E). 







































































When the val  ue of ti  me dif  ference is extreme large, the welf  are gain fr  om SB is very cl  ose to that 
fr om   FB.  T he  relat ive  effici ency  of  TB  pol icy  t o  F B  pol icy  at  this  point  r eaches  77% .  T he  ef ficiency
of   PM poli  cy is al  so im  proved compar  ed wit  h base scenar  io,   and it can produce a posi  tive wel  far  e
gain when the value of tim  e dif  fer  ence is hi  gh.   K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
1  8 
4.CONCLUSION
Our result  s dem  onstr  ate the import  ance of heter  ogeneity in value of tim  e for   evaluat  ing congest  ion
poli cies  that  offer  pri cing  as  an  option.  General ly,   the  exi st ence  of  het erogenei ty  favor s  such
poli cies  because  product  dif fer ent iation  then  offers  a  great er  advantage:  those  wi th  hi gh  values  of
ti  me reap more benef  its fr  om   the high-priced option,   while those wit  h low values of tim  e find it all 
the mor  e i  mport  ant   not to be subject  ed to policies aimed at the aver  age user  .
Nevertheless,  insi st ing  that   one  of  the  pr oduct s  be  free  imposes  qui te  a  lar ge  penal ty,   except  when
heterogeneit y  i s  ext rem e.  In  our  base  scenar io  and  for  middl ing  am ounts  of   heterogeneit y,  a  second-
best   one-r oute  pri ci ng  pol icy  achi eves  onl y  one-fi ft h  to  one-half  the  possible  wel fare  gai ns  of   fi rst-
best   pr ici ng,  and  uses  a  t ol l  smal ler  t han  even  the  lower  of   the  t wo  optim al ly  dif ferentiated  t oll s. 
Even  more  di scouragi ng  is  the  f inding  t hat   poli cies  that  m ai ntain  nearl y  congestion- free  t ravel   in  t he
pr  iced roadway set   the pri  ce far higher  , and achieve far lower benef  its, than second-best pr  ici  ng.   In
the  maj ori ty  of   cases,  the  overall   benefit s  from  pri cing  are  negat ive  f or  these  poli cies.  Of   course,   this
does not account for   the possibili  ty that such pol  icies may be the only way the lanes can be built   at
al  l,   or   the onl  y way they can be opened to general   t  raf  fic.
Fr om   these  observati ons,  we  draw  thr ee  concl usi ons  about  par tial-pri cing  pol ici es  under   hi ghly
congest  ed condi  tions. The fi  rst   two are in accord wi  th studi  es based on homogeneous users.   First,
when  polit ics  or  other  consi der ati ons  dict at e  that   one  roadway  be  fr ee,   aggr egate  costs  can  be
reduced by lett  ing the pri  ced roadway become at   least moderatel  y congested; car  pooli  ng mandates
or   privati  zation goals may prevent   this, but   they do so at   a heavy cost  . Second, under many
conditi  ons part  ial   pricing poli  cies are inadequate substit  ut  es for   more thor  oughgoing pricing
poli  cies. The thir  d conclusi  on is that accounti  ng for heterogeneit  y does improve the perform  ance of
part ial -pr icing  poli cies  by  creati ng  si gni fi cant  val ue  for   product   diff erent iat ion,  especi al ly  when  the
pr ice-el asticiti es  for  t ot al  dem and  i s  high  and  congesti on  in  the  absence  of  tol ls  is  extr eme.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
1  9 
REFERENCES
Arnott, R., A. de Palma and R. Lindsey (1992) "Route choice with heterogeneous drivers and
group-specific congestion costs" Regional Science and Urban Economics 22 pp. 71-102.
Bradford, Richard M. (1996) "Pricing, Routing, and Incentive Compatibility in Multiserver
Queues," European Journal of Operational Research 89, pp. 226-236.
Braid, Ralph M. (1996) "Peak-load pricing of a transportation route with an unpriced substitute"
Journal of Urban Economics 40 pp. 179-197.
Brownstone, D., Golob, T. F. and Kazimi, C. (1999) "Modeling non-ignorable attrition and
measurement error in panel surveys: an application to travel demand modeling," Irvine
Economics Paper 99-00-06, University of California at Irvine
Dahlgren, Joy (1998) "High occupancy vehicle lanes: not always more effective than general
purpose lanes" Transportation Research 32A, pp. 99-114
Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) Task Force on High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT)
     Lanes (1998) "High-Occupancy/Toll (HOT) Lanes and Value Pricing: A
     Preliminary Assessment," Institute of Traffic Engineers (ITE) Journal (June), pp.
     30-32, 38, 40.
Liu, Louie Nan, and John F. McDonald (1998) "Efficient congestion tolls in the presence of
unpriced congestion: a peak and off-peak simulation model" Journal of Urban Economics
44, pp. 352-366.
______ (1999) "Economic efficiency of second-best congestion pricing schemes in urban
highway systems" Transportation Research 33B pp. 157-188.
Shmanske, Stephen (1991) "Price discrimination and congestion" National Tax Journal 44, pp.
529-532
______ (1993) "A simulation of price-discrimination tolls" Journal of Transport Economics and
Policy 27, pp. 225-235
Small, Kenneth A. (1983) "Bus Priority and Congestion Pricing on Urban Expressways."
     In T. E. Keeler (ed.), Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. 1, (Greenwich,
     Connecticut: JAI Press), pp. 27-74.
Small, Kenneth A. and José A. Gómez-Ibanez (1998) "Road Pricing for Congestion
Management: The Transition from Theory to Policy," in: Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion
and the Environment: Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility, ed. by K.J. Button and
E.T. Verhoef. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 213-246.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8
2  0 
Sullivan, E. (1998) Evaluating the impacts of the SR 91 variable-toll express lane facility: Final
report,  report to California Department of Transportation. Dept. of Civil and
Environmental Engineering, Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo, California.
Toll Roads Newsletter, 40 (June 1999). Frederick, Maryland: Toll Roads Newsletter.
Transportation Research Board (1994) Highway Capacity Manual. Special Report 209, 3rd
edition. Washington: National Research Council.
Verhoef, E.T., P. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (1996) "Second-best congestion pricing: the case of
an untolled alternative" Journal of Urban Economics 40 (3) pp. 279-302.
Verhoef, Erik T., and Kenneth A. Small (1999) "Product Differentiation on Roads: Second-Best
Congestion Pricing with Heterogeneity under Public and Private Ownership," Irvine
Economics Paper 99-00-01, University of California at Irvine.
Viton, Philip A. (1995), "Private roads" Journal of Urban Economics 37, pp. 260-289.
Wardrop, J.G. (1952) "Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research" Proceedings of the
Institute of Civil Engineers, 1(II), pp. 325-378.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
2  1 
APPENDIX
 A.  1 Th  e   g  en  e  ra  l fo  rm of   th  e no  n  -l  in  ea  r pro  gra  mmin  g pro  bl  e  m an  d the   p  o  ss  ib  le 
s  ol  ut  io  n  s. 
We assume that at least some type 1 users use road A and at least some type 2 users use road B.
We consider a congested traffic condition, so the toll charged under a policy regime is strictly
greater than zero. The general form of the first-best (FB) problem in this paper can therefore be
written as:




N N N N
c N dt t P dt t P W





. .t s () () 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 = − + − + ≡ A A A A B A N N c N N P h τ  (A.1a)
     () () 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 = − + − + ≡ B B B B B A N N c N N P h τ (A.1b)
     () 0 1 1 1 3 = − − ⋅ ≡ B B B c P N h τ (A.1c)
     () 0 2 2 2 4 = − − ⋅ ≡ A A A c P N h τ (A.1d)
     () () 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 ≤ − + − + ≡ B B B B B A N N c N N P g τ (A.1e)
     () () 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 ≤ − + − + ≡ A A A A B N N c N N P g τ (A.1f)
     0 N g B 1 3 ≤ − ≡ (A.1g)
     0 2 4 ≤ − ≡ A N g (A.1h)
where  ()⋅ P  and  ()⋅ c  are the functions defined by (2) and (1). Certain constraints are added for the
SB, TB, and PM policy, and the objective function is replaced by toll revenues in PM policy.
Because we assume  0 , 2 1 > B A N N . (A.1a-b) are the same as (3) of the paper; (A.1c-d) are
equivalent to (5c-d); (A.1e-f) to (5a-b); and (A.1g-h) to (5e).
Suppose  4 3 2 1 , , , λ λ λ λ are the Lagrangian multipliers for the first four equality constraint
conditions, and  2 1,γ γ , 4 3,γ γ are those associated with the inequality constraints. According to



























* , , , γ γ γ γ γ =  are:










i i N g N h N W γ λ  (A.2a)
() 0
* * = N g j j γ , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = j (A.2b)
0
* ≥ j γ ,  4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = j (A.2c)
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If constraints (A.1e) and (A.1f) are binding at the same time, the tolls on both routes must be
equal as shown in section 2. This is impossible for SB, TB and PM policy and our numerical
results also show that this case is never optimal for FB policy. As a result, the possible solution
cases for the programming problem are only three:
1.  0
*
1 = γ ,  0
*
2 > γ  (SE1);
In this case, (A.2c) 0 2 = ⇒ g , i.e., (A.1f) must be binding. This means type 2 users are
indifferent for two routes. Then (A.1e) cannot be binding, i.e., type 1 users strictly prefer road A
and, from (A.1c),  0
*
1 = B N .
2.  0
*
1 > γ ,  0
*
2 = γ  (SE2);
In this case, constraint (A.1e) is binding and constraint (A.1f) is not binding, and  0
*
2 = A N .
3.  0
*
1 = γ  and  0
*
2 = γ ;
In this case, we can only say (from the argument above) that (A.1e) or (A.1f) or both must be
non-binding, therefore 
*
1B N  or 
*
2A N  or both must be zero. Considering the following three
different solution cases:
 3a. (A.1f) is binding and (A.1e) is not. 
*
1B N  is zero in this case (SE1).
 3b. (A.1e) is binding and (A.1f) is not. 
*
2A N  is zero in this case (SE2).
 3c. Both (A.1e) and (A.1f) are non-binding. 
*
1B N  and 
*
2A N  are both zero (SE).
In the paper, we divide the programming problem into different cases (SE, SE1, SE2) and solve
each case under each policy. The above classification shows that the solutions from these cases
include all of the possible solutions for the whole problem.
A.2   T  he   de  ri  v  at  io  n of op  t  imal   t  o  ll  s of ea  ch   eq  ui  l  ib  ri  um in   e  a  ch   p  ol  i  cy 
 In this section, we show how the general problem simplifies in each policy and equilibrium type
(here described as "case"). In each case, we leave the non-negative constraints (A.1g-h) are
implicit, as noted in the paper, we check each of them separately and impose it as an equality if
required.
A. 2.1 FB Policy
    Case SE. Substituting  0 1 = B N  and  0 2 = A N  into the welfare function, the welfare maximizing
problem can be written as:
() () ∫∫ ⋅ − ⋅ − + =
AB NN
B B B A A A N c N N c N dt t P dt t P W
12
00
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 ) ( ) ( max
The objective function is strictly concave because it equals the sum of four strictly concave
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be solved out from the first-order conditions. The corresponding tolls on the two routes are
determined by (A.1a-b) and can be shown to be:
() A A A A A A MEC N c N c P 1 1 1 1 1 1 ≡ ′ ⋅ = − =τ
() B B B B B B MEC N c N c P 2 2 2 2 2 2 ≡ ′ ⋅ = − =τ
The optimal toll on each road is equal to the difference between social and private marginal cost
on that road, known as "marginal external cost" MEC , just as in a single-route model.
   Case SE1. Substituting  0 1 = B N  into welfare function, we get:
  ( )( ) ()() ( ) ∫∫
+
− + ⋅ − + ⋅ − +
=
AB A NN N




2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
max
This objective function is also strictly concave because it equals the sum of five strictly concave
functions. The corresponding tolls are:
() ( ) ( ) A A A A A A A A A A A A A c P MEC N N c N N N c N c N P 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 − = ≡ + ′ + + ′ = − = τ
( ) () () B B B B B B B A B MEC N c N N c N N P 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ≡ ′ = − + = τ
The tolls are again the differences between social and private marginal costs on each route. The
social cost on route A includes the users of both groups; the social cost on route B includes just
the users of group 2. We also check the corner solution of  0 2 = A N  in the simulation study.
   Case SE2: Substituting 0 2 = A N  into the welfare function, we get:
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) B B B B B B B B A A A
N N N
N N c N N N c N N c N dt t P dt t P
W
B B A











Again, the objective function is strictly concave so the so the solution is unique. The tolls to
decentralize the optimal traffic allocation in this case are:
() ( ) A A A A A B A A MEC N c N c N N P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ≡ ′ = − + = τ
() () () B B B B B B B B B B B B A B c P MEC N N c N N N c N c N N P 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − = ≡ + ′ + + ′ = − + = τ
Here the social cost on route A includes just the users of group 1 and the social cost on route B
includes the users of both groups. The corner solution of  0 1 = B N  is also checked in the
simulation study.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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A. 2.2  SB and TB Policies
    Case SE . The  welfare maximizing problem under second-best pricing policy for fully
separated equilibrium case can be written as:
() () ( ) ( ) ∫∫ − − + =
AB NN
B B B A A A N c N N c N dt t P dt t P W
12
00
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 max
. .t s () () B B B N c N P 2 2 2 2 =
B N2  is determined solely by the constraint and numerical results in the paper show that there is
only one positive real solution for  B N2 . The objective function is a strictly function of  A N1 , so if
this case can occur, the solution is unique. The corresponding toll on route A is:
() A A A A A MEC N c N 1 1 1 1 ≡ ′ = τ
This toll is just the difference of social and private marginal cost on that road, the social cost
including just the users of group 1. There are no route spill-overs in fully separated equilibrium:
that is, road A is treated just as in the FB policy.
     Case SE1. The corresponding Lagrangian is:
( )( )() () ( )
( ) ()() []
() ( ) [] B B B A
A A A A A A A
B B B A A A A A A A A
N N N
N c N N P
N N c P N N c N P
N c N N N c N N N c N dt t P dt t P L
B A A
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1







+ + − + − −




where the constraints (A.1a-b) have been rewritten using (A.1f) as an equality in order to
eliminate  A τ  as a variable. The Lagrangian Multiplier  1 λ  represents the "Shadow Price" of not
price discriminated on road A, that is, it represents the increase of social welfare that could be
achieved by charging type-1 users more than type-2 users, since the latter have a sub-optimally
priced substitute (road B).This problem can be solved for  B A A N N N 2 2 1 , , and  2 1,λ λ . The toll








′ ′ − ′ ′ − ′ ′
′ + ′ − ′ ⋅ ′ ′
− ′ + ′ =
B B
A A B B
A A A A A c P c P P P
c c P c N P
c N c N
2 2 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 τ
The toll on route A equals to marginal external cost plus an adjustment term which depends on
the slope of demand function and cost function.
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() ( ) [] () () [] B B B B A B B B B N N c N N P N N c N P W L 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 + − + − + − − = γ λ
where (A.1e) has been used as an equality with Larangian multiplier  1 γ which represents the
"shadow price" of not being able to price discriminated on road B.








′ ′ − ′ ′ − ′ ′
′ ′ ′ − ′ −
+ ′ =
B B
B B B B
A A A c P c P P P
P P c N c N
c N
1 2 2 1 2 1
1 2 2 2 1 1
1 1 τ
The toll here equals to the marginal congestion cost plus a adjustment term which depends on the
slope of demand function as well as costfunction.
It is difficult to judge analytically whether the solution is unique in case SE1 and SE2 of SB
policy because of the non-linear form of the constraints. In the simulation study, we use different
initial values to show that in these cases no more than one equilibrium solution can be found.
The TB policy is the same as the SB policy except that we add an extra constraint (6), which we
check separately rather than including in the Lagrangian.
A. 2.3  PM Policy
The maximizing problem here has the same constraints as the ones in the SB policy. The only
different is that the objective function now is:
() () ( ) [] () () [] A A a B A A A A A A A N N c N N P N N N c N P N R 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 + − + + + − =
   Case SE. The solution of this case must be unique because the same  reason as SE case in SB
policy. The toll which maximizes revenue is found to be:
() ] [ 1 1 1 1
′ − ′ = P N c N A A A A τ
The toll is set at marginal social cost plus a monopolistic mark-up which is inversely related to
the demand elasticity of group 1. Equivalently, this equation can be written as
A A A A c N P N 1 1 1 1 ′ = ′ + τ , that is, marginal revenue equals marginal cost.








′ ′ + ′ − ′ ′ − ′ ′
′ + ′ − ′ ′ ′ − ′ ′ + ′ ′
+ ′ − ′ + ′ =
B B
A A B A A B A
A A A A A A c P P c P P P
c c P c P N P P N c P N
P N c N c N
2 2
2
2 2 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( 2
) (
τ
Again the toll equals marginal congestion cost plus a monopolistic mark-up.  K e n ne t h A.  Sm a l l a nd  J ia  Ya n R  FF  D is c us s i o n Pa pe r  0 0 - 0 8 
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′ ′ − ′ − ′ ′
′ − ′ ′
+ ′ − ′ =




1 1 1 1 P c c P P
c P P N
P N c N
B B
B A
A A A A τ
Again, the uniqueness of equilibrium solution for case SE1 and SE2 is proved numerically.